On February 4th, President Trump announced that he had signed an executive order reintroducing the so-called “maximum pressure” strategy on Iran, adding that the new document contains “very tough” clauses, which led him to carefully consider its signing until the last moment. Commenting on the enactment of the new measure, President Trump also added that he hopes that the new provisions on Iran would not have to be applied for long, thus opening up the possibility of defining a new agreement with the Islamic Republic, where unconfirmed rumors have been circulating for some time.
The signing of the new executive order thus reinstates the measures already taken towards the country during his first presidential term, aimed at preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon through the imposition of sanctions and financial isolation, mainly affecting the oil sector in all its forms at an international level.
In the usual narrative that accompanies the decisions made by the president, he stated, on the sidelines of the press conference announcing the measure, that he had left instructions for the “annihilation” of Iran in the event that he were to be assassinated by Iranian emissaries.
Trump, through his social media account Truth, also stated that the news circulated in the press regarding an alleged joint project between the USA and Israel to strike Iran militarily is “exaggerated”, adding that he prefers a verified agreement that offers the country the opportunity to prosper peacefully. This message once again seemed to suggest that the US administration is interested in taking the path of negotiation with Iran, although the terms of a possible agreement are not yet known, making it rather difficult to assess the real possibilities.
Trump’s words had an immediate impact in Iran, perceived with a rather mixed assessment, fully reflecting the traditional differences not only between reformists and conservatives, but also between the first generation in power and the much larger second generation.
The first generation, which still formally represents the top of the country’s political establishment, is now numerically residual, unlike the second which is instead pervasive throughout the institutional, economic and military apparatus.
Deep differences of opinion characterize the debate between these two generations regarding a possible agreement with the United States on the nuclear program. The first generation, of which Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is a part, has always expressed its opposition to any form of militarization of the nuclear program, understanding the risk in terms of international relations and security, while at the same time showing great caution towards any form of negotiation with the USA, towards whom they have a deep mistrust, especially as a result of the failure of the previous agreement of 2015 (the JCPOA). At the same time, however, large segments of this generation believe that an agreement with the USA and the international community represents the only real solution to get out of the current impasse and the serious economic crisis affecting the country, showing interest in the veiled overtures that can be glimpsed among the harsh threats made by President Trump.
The second generation, on the other hand, believes that the real objective of the USA, even through negotiation, is to destroy the resistance capabilities of the Islamic Republic, hypothesizing that the margin for a new agreement with Washington will not be limited to the nuclear program alone, but also to the entire Iranian defense industrial apparatus, nullifying any deterrent capability the country may have.
Within this generational component, it seems that a new belief has gained ground, assessing on the contrary that only through the development of a nuclear weapon Iran will be able to re-establish the criteria for an effective deterrent, laying the foundations for negotiation scenarios that are more advantageous for the country and for the survival of its political and institutional system.
A very complex situation, therefore, to which is added the loss of Iran’s defense capability expressed by the structure of regional alliances known as the “axis of resistance”, strongly weakened both by Israel’s action against Hamas and Hezbollah and by the fall of Bashar al-Asad’s regime in Syria.
In the past, Iran has shown little inclination towards international dialogue when under strong political and economic pressure, and it seems likely that even on this occasion the application of the new provisions on maximum pressure may prove futile. At the same time, however, the unpredictability of the new American administration could reveal options and details – not currently visible or known – that could give a new boost to the dialogue. This is something that many of the members of the first generation in Iran hope for, as they are in fact forced into an uncomfortable position between the pressures of the US administration and those of their own internal political context.
