In a news story that went unnoticed, Algerian media outlets reported on March 2 that a representative office of the National Council of the Rif, the governing body of the Nationalist Party of the Rif, had opened in the capital, marking a new stage in the escalating tensions with neighboring Morocco.
The Nationalist Party of the Rif, a Moroccan independentist organization that claims autonomy for the same region, has long been supported by Algeria as part of a relationship designed to increase tensions with the government in Rabat by instrumentalizing the rhetoric of defending the region’s autonomist and independence aspirations.
The decision to open a representative office of the Nationalist Party of the Rif also constitutes in Algiers’ perspective a response to Morocco’s frequent appeals in favor of the right of self-determination of the Algerian Kabylian people. Appeals in turn brought about by Algeria’s continued support for the independence of the Saharawi people of Western Sahara, in a crisis dynamic rooted in the historic opposition between the two countries for regional leadership, which increasingly exploits the issues of independence movements as a tool to increase the crisis profile between Rabat and Algiers.
The most recent phase of the crisis began in December 2020, when U.S. President Trump effectively recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara region, contingent on Rabat’s recognition of the State of Israel and the formalization of diplomatic relations under the so-called Abraham’s Accord.
The U.S. decision, later followed by other countries, rekindled the fuse of a crisis long dormant and frozen in the dimension of a latent conflict, once again bringing relations between Algeria and Morocco to the breaking point. The formalization of diplomatic relations between Morocco and Israel has thus provided the pretext for Algeria to take an increasingly rigid stance toward Tel Aviv, followed later by support for Hamas action and a more general support for the Palestinian cause, while at the same time strengthening relations with Iran and Russia, and announcing a mighty program of rearmament of its armed forces.
Algeria is also increasingly critical of the United Arab Emirates, accusing it of fomenting regional conflicts and implicitly denouncing its support for Morocco on the issue of the Western Sahara, while the leader of the Polisario Front, Brahim Ghali – supported by Algeria – has also recently accused the Emirates of opposing the independence of the Saharawi people through military support for the Moroccan army.
Particularly outspoken in this regard was Algerian President Abdelmajid Tebboune, when on March 30 in an interview, he referred to the UAE – without, however, naming it explicitly but referring to it as “a fraternal Arab country” – claiming that “where there are conflicts, this state’s money is there” and adding that he considered Abu Dhabi’s strategies in the region illogical.
Algeria’s foreign policy thus emerged from the long period of inertia that had characterized Bouteflika’s presidency, yet placed itself in a somewhat conflicted position in the region. Bolstered also by its seat on the UN Security Council, Algiers became particularly vocal in its criticism of Israel, suffered a gradual deterioration in relations with France – which simultaneously opened up more in the direction of Morocco – and Spain, while increased relations with Russia, China and Iran made relations with the United States even more critical.
On the contrary, this strategy has favored Morocco, whose international ties have emerged strengthened by the growing crisis with Algeria, positioning itself as a privileged interlocutor of the United States, most Europeans and several Persian Gulf actors, who look with growing fear at Algiers’ political initiatives.
Concern, at the same time, is posed by the rearmament program that both Algeria and Morocco have initiated over the past few years, whose combined budget accounts for 74 percent of military spending in all of North Africa. Algeria has a military spending program in 2024 of $21.6 billion, while Morocco plans to spend $12.1 billion, a clear uptick from $9.1 billion and $5 billion respectively in 2022. An arms race that, although at present the possibility of direct conflict seems quite unlikely, raises alarm because of the possibility that it could trigger new and more serious regional crises, as well as the strengthening presence of exogenous actors to the region but with well-defined agendas of interest, such as Russia in particular.
