The United States, Somalia, and the internationally recognized government of Yemen have recently raised the alarm over what they describe as growing cooperation between the Somali jihadist group al-Shabaab and Ansarallah (the Houthis), based in northern Yemen.
Despite profound religious and ideological differences, the two groups are believed to have initiated a mutually beneficial partnership as early as 2023, built around arms trafficking and the management of financial flows. This cooperation has reportedly enabled the Somali militants to gain access to increasingly sophisticated weaponry.
According to information revealed by the Wall Street Journal on August 31, the main intermediary in this relationship was reportedly a Somali national, Jibril Yahya Ali, also known as “One Armed.” Married to a Yemeni woman, Ali is believed to have facilitated increasingly close cooperation between al-Shabaab and the Houthis since 2023, enabling al-Shabaab to acquire drones, explosives, and other advanced equipment, alongside intensive training programs involving at least one hundred Somali jihadist fighters — and as many as four hundred, according to other sources.
The Somali side is reportedly financing these activities by expanding extortion operations and, above all, by giving renewed impetus to maritime piracy off the coasts of Puntland and Somaliland, as reportedly demonstrated by the sharp increase in the number of hijackings in recent months.
Jibril Yahya Ali was subsequently killed in Yemen last February during a U.S. airstrike. However, military and economic cooperation between al-Shabaab and the Houthis has continued, further driven by the parallel evolution of regional political dynamics.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty, in particular, has led to an increased presence of Israeli officials in the region, prompting the Houthis to seek even closer cooperation with al-Shabaab.
A number of Israeli and U.S. analysts believe that this Houthi strategy of expanding its presence and influence across the African continent — both in Somalia and Sudan — forms part of a broader effort coordinated by Iran to expand the network of capabilities associated with the so-called “Axis of Resistance.”
The direct link between Iran and Houthi activities in East Africa, however, is more difficult to substantiate. This suggests that the initiative may in fact be driven primarily by a strategy conceived and managed by the Houthis themselves, reflecting Ansarallah’s own interest in expanding its regional influence and power.
Such a development is unlikely to be opposed — and may in fact be encouraged — by Iran, whose objective is to broaden the capabilities of groups with which it shares key strategic principles and objectives. Many of these actors, while broadly subscribing to the principles of the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” pursue goals that are more closely connected to their own domestic political dynamics. As a result, they formulate regional strategies that overlap with, or only incidentally coincide with, their relationship with Tehran.
These dynamics highlight the high degree of pragmatism among the actors participating in the broader partnership with Iran, as demonstrated precisely by the relationship between the Houthis and al-Shabaab, which transcends the traditional ideological divisions between the Sunni groups aligned with al-Qaeda and the Shi’a communities.
The perception of shared threats therefore generates a common interest in cooperation. This cooperation is driven not by the pursuit of shared ideological objectives — which remain specific to each organization — but rather by tactical goals designed to support their respective individual strategies.
It is therefore difficult to identify a common denominator among the different components of this broader partnership. Instead, the actors involved cooperate primarily to satisfy their own specific requirements.
Iran has an interest in consolidating the Houthis’ offensive capabilities in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which would represent a systemic enhancement of its own ability to disrupt freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. The Houthis, meanwhile, pursue a threefold objective: to strengthen their role in threatening maritime security in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean; to counter the growing Israeli presence in the region; and to sustain their own economic system through arms sales and the provision of training programs. Al-Shabaab, finally, is able to enhance its offensive capabilities through the acquisition of attack drones and the training of its personnel, thereby generating the additional military capacity it considers necessary to confront the Somali federal government and its principal allies.
There is, however, at least one element of novelty in the relationship between the Houthis and al-Shabaab. According to former Somali National Security Adviser Hussein Sheikh-Ali, who published an analysis of the relationship between the two groups last February, their cooperation has evolved beyond the simple transfer of weapons toward a more structured relationship, characterized by “direct political, media, and military” cooperation. Such an evolution could potentially give rise to a new and more insidious dimension of the threat.
