Since the discovery of America at the end of the 15th century, the international system has had an Atlantic centrality, which reached a significant milestone with the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914. The Second World War and the Cold War continued this trend, with the creation of NATO being a very clear example.
For its part, the South Atlantic is still important for ships that exceed the limits of the Panama Canal and need to use the natural passages: the Strait of Magellan, the Beagle Channel or the Drake Passage in South America, or South Africa on the African continent.
In the 21st century, when the Indo-Pacific has become the stage for the dispute between the United States and China, it has a geopolitical importance that hardly needs to be justified.
Thus, South Africa and South America (especially Argentina and Chile) remain geopolitically important as natural passages between the Indo-Pacific and the South Atlantic.
In recent months, the problems faced by the Panama Canal as a result of climate change – the drought has meant that ships have had to reduce the amount of cargo they carry through the canal – and the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, which have forced shipping companies to revert to the South African route, have put these two inter-ocean passages back on the international agenda.
As a result, we are witnessing a real competition for position at these points, which are real ‘choke points’ in the international system and the main global players are implementing policies in this regard.
China has taken the lead by investing in ports in sub-Saharan Africa on both the Atlantic and Indian coasts, and developments in its navy promise that in the near future its presence will not only be economic. Its navy is increasingly a ‘blue water’ navy with a greater capacity for global projection.
The port of Chancay (Peru), which will be completed by the end of this year, or the (so far frustrated) port investment projects in the Argentinean ports of Rio Grande and Ushuaia, are part of this scheme of global presence.
The maritime dimension of its “New Silk Road” project includes and justifies investment in the port infrastructure of the southern hemisphere.
The United States, for its part, continues to view these Chinese initiatives with concern and has increased its military projection with the creation of the Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007 and the re-establishment of the Fourth Fleet in the South Atlantic in 2008. It has also publicly stated that it perceives the Chinese presence in the American southern hemisphere as a direct threat to its interests and, in a context of global competition, is showing greater closeness to the countries of the region in order to counterbalance the Chinese presence.
Russia, which once had a presence in the South Atlantic during the years of the Angolan conflict, no longer has the military projection capacity or the financial resources to secure a secure base in the southern hemisphere. The war in Ukraine has attracted Russia’s strategic attention, and to a lesser extent the Arctic, but not other regions such as those considered here.
The United Kingdom, for its part, has an enviable presence in the South Atlantic: Ascension Island, St Helena, Tristan da Cunha and the Malvinas Islands, claimed by Argentina. It is also one of seven states with territorial claims in Antarctica, although its military projection capability in the region is secondary to the North Atlantic and Indo-Pacific, the two priority areas for its carrier groups.
France is the only EU country with territorial claims in Antarctica; this, together with a military presence in South America (Guyana), Atlantic African countries, including an operation in the Gulf of Guinea, a base in the Horn of Africa and the Indo-Pacific islands (a term coined by French geopoliticians) that make up the French overseas departments, positions Paris as the European country with the greatest projection in the Pacific-Atlantic-Antarctic southern hemisphere. The current Jean d’Arc 2024 deployment in South America, which includes visits to 11 ports and military exercises with Chile and Brazil, as well as other programs of cooperation and military exercises in sub-Saharan Africa, demonstrate France’s interest in these regions.
As far as Italy is concerned, the concept of ‘Mediterraneo allargato’ (Enlarged Mediterranean) extends to the Atlantic coasts of Africa, although military deployment is still limited, something that should be reviewed in the light of Italy’s growing energy relations with the countries of the Gulf of Guinea, as well as the investments made by Italian companies in the region. The large communities of Italian nationals in South America (particularly Argentina and Brazil) remain a factor that is woefully under-utilised by all Italian governments and could be seen as a potential basis for a greater Italian presence in the region. The presence of the Italian naval training ship Amerigo Vespucci is an example of how much can be achieved in terms of public diplomacy as a first step towards a more substantial policy.
We can point out that there are two major issues that demonstrate the importance of the Pacific-Atlantic inter-oceanic passages in the Southern Hemisphere: The first is the maritime trade routes, where South Africa is very important, but South America could become even more important in the event of problems with the Panama Canal, which is unfortunately very plausible, not only because of possible attacks on this infrastructure, but also because of the impact of climate change on this artificial passage.
Second, the Antarctic continent, proximity is closer to the South American continent than to South Africa, but both are much closer than to Australia or New Zealand. As the Antarctic Treaty system becomes more vociferous and less capable to reach consensus, securing proximity to Antarctica will become a matter of strategic importance.
To sum up, in an increasingly navalised and competitive international system, no state should neglect the politics of the Southern Hemisphere’s inter-oceanic passages. The risk of not doing so is to be excluded and to suffer the constraints imposed by other actors.
