On 20 September, seven politico-military groups opposed to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government announced the formation of an alliance aimed at overthrowing the federal government, which they accuse of having unleashed the “wars and crises” that have torn the country apart. The Prime Minister’s nationalist and centralizing agenda has effectively disrupted Ethiopia’s traditional ethno-federal political balance, fueling tensions across several regional states that eventually erupted into the bloody Tigray War in 2020. Although the conflict formally ended in 2022, its repercussions continue to be felt in Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray itself.
On 23 September, Tigrayan forces aligned with the TPLF launched a multi-front offensive, taking control of the main airports in Tigray and, alongside allied forces, moving to confront Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) troops along the borders with Amhara and Afar.
Despite some initial successes, federal forces soon regained the initiative, pushing northward toward Tigray and capturing several of the region’s main population centers. The rapid advance, which is still underway and is aimed ultimately at retaking the regional capital, Mekelle, has undoubtedly produced significant gains. It would nevertheless be premature to interpret it as a decisive defeat for the opposing militias. As the 2020–22 conflict demonstrated, defeating regional armed groups on their home ground—particularly in the rugged and mountainous areas of northern Ethiopia—requires military capabilities that the ENDF may not possess. The conflict therefore remains fluid, with several possible trajectories still open.
The crisis could also spill beyond Tigray’s borders in the near term and once again draw Eritrea into the conflict, as the federal government in Addis Ababa accuses Asmara of supporting the rebel forces.
Understanding the dynamics of this new conflict requires, however, a closer look at its recent historical and political evolution. The end of Tigrayan dominance in Ethiopian politics in 2018 brought Abiy Ahmed to power as prime minister. He subsequently embarked on a process of political transformation centered on dismantling the country’s ethno-federal system through greater nationalist centralization. The resulting tensions quickly escalated into the bloody Tigray War of 2020–22.
This transformation also reshaped Ethiopia’s relationship with Eritrea. Abiy Ahmed signed a peace agreement with Asmara and subsequently brought Eritrea into the war against the Tigrayan forces, which had long been hostile to the government of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki.
After a series of military and political reversals, the war ended in 2022 with the Pretoria Agreement, which confirmed the victory of the federal forces and ushered in a complex transitional period. The enormous human and material costs of the conflict fundamentally altered the political balance not only in Tigray but also in Amhara.
The Pretoria Agreement succeeded in ending the fighting, but it did not restore stability to the country. Key issues remained unresolved, including the status of Western Tigray, much of which was under the control of Amhara forces; the disarmament of both Tigrayan forces and the Amhara Fano militias; and the reintegration of the Tigrayan political party, the TPLF, into national political life.
The agreement also excluded Eritrea from the reconciliation process, setting the stage for a renewed deterioration in relations with the federal government. Tensions between Addis Ababa and Asmara were further aggravated by repeated statements from Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed about Ethiopia’s need to secure access to the sea—remarks that Eritrea interpreted as a direct threat to its sovereignty.
In June 2026, Ethiopia held legislative elections that resulted in the expected victory of Prime Minister Abiy’s Prosperity Party. Security concerns led to the exclusion of both Tigray and Amhara from the vote, contributing to a new escalation in tensions.
At the same time, Tigray’s interim administration had already entered a profound crisis in 2025. In March, the pro-federal regional government was ousted by the TPLF’s more hardline leadership, headed by Debretsion Gebremichael. Sporadic clashes subsequently broke out in several parts of Tigray, giving rise to a new set of alliances that differ substantially from the traditional alignments of Ethiopian politics.
The TPLF moved closer to its historic enemy, Eritrea, united by a common objective: the removal of Abiy Ahmed’s government. At the same time, the Amhara Fano forces—which had fought against the Tigrayan forces during the 2020–22 war—joined the broader alliance of seven armed groups opposed to the federal government. The coalition also includes groups from Afar, Oromia, and Benishangul-Gumuz.
From 20 September onward, the conflict entered a new phase, expanding both in intensity and geographical scope. The Alliance’s initial offensive achieved a number of gains, particularly along the border with Amhara and deep inside Afar.
On 25 September, federal forces launched a counteroffensive that quickly began to recover lost ground, advancing primarily along the southern Tigray axis. On 30 September, they captured the strategically important city of Alamata.
The rebel forces, meanwhile, demonstrated their ability to strike deep behind federal lines, using armed drones to hit a number of ENDF military targets. On 1 October, at least three drones struck targets in Addis Ababa itself.
Despite the speed and success of the federal advance into Tigrayan territory, it is important to recall that the initial rapid advance in 2020 was also followed by a devastating reversal. The federal forces ultimately struggled to sustain operations against regional militias operating on their own territory, particularly in the rugged mountainous terrain of northern Ethiopia.
The new conflict in Tigray is further complicated by its increasingly pronounced regional dimension. Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of supporting the rebel forces, particularly those operating in Tigray and Afar. Eritrea, in turn, is backed by Egypt and Sudan, whose relations with Ethiopia have deteriorated over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile.
Opponents of Abiy Ahmed, meanwhile, accuse him of establishing an alliance with the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commanded by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti. The RSF has been accused of grave abuses in Darfur and in Sudan’s ongoing civil war. Abiy’s detractors have also identified the United Arab Emirates as a supporter of the federal government, alleging that Abu Dhabi provides Addis Ababa with financial assistance and military equipment.
The result is a highly complex and increasingly regionalized crisis. For now, the conflict appears to be moving toward an effort by federal forces to capture Mekelle, the capital of Tigray, with the aim of effectively ending the TPLF’s political role in the regional state.
That trajectory, however, could be disrupted by two critical factors. The first is the possibility that Eritrea may directly enter the conflict. The second is the potential return of the guerrilla warfare dynamics that, during the 2020–22 war, placed ENDF units under considerable strain and ultimately demonstrated the difficulties faced by federal forces when fighting regional militias on their own terrain.
