On 4 September, the forces of Ansarallah, more commonly known as the Houthis, launched a powerful military operation against several militias allied with the internationally recognised government of Aden, concentrating their attack primarily on areas of the Taiz and Hodeida governorates and the Hayis district.
The political stalemate of recent months, characterised by persistent tensions and a growing number of clashes, has thus once again turned into open conflict, with the Houthis launching a military operation through which, during the very first hours of fighting, they succeeded in capturing numerous strategic positions, forcing the Aden-based forces to send a large number of reinforcements along a substantial part of the Red Sea coastline.
The escalation of recent days has brought about a significant change in the nature of the conflict that has divided Ansarallah’s northern government from the southern government in Aden for years—the latter, moreover, being internally fragmented into numerous factions that are often in conflict with one another—and supported militarily by Saudi Arabia. Within the space of just a few days, the conflict has shifted from one fought largely at long range through the use of drones and missiles towards a predominantly close-quarters, ground-based confrontation, in which the militias of the two sides are facing one another directly in the struggle for territorial control.
The Houthis’ decision to launch this new and powerful offensive is certainly driven by the desire to break free from the negotiating stalemate that has so far prevented the country from initiating a substantive process of national reconciliation. This has been accompanied, on the part of Ansarallah, by demands for the lifting of the de facto blockade of the ports imposed by the Saudis, as well as expectations of substantial financial compensation from Riyadh to fund the reconstruction of the damage caused by years of war.
The simultaneous conflict in Iran has clearly demonstrated how a shift towards asymmetric warfare can prove effective, convincing the Houthis of both the possibility and the necessity of redirecting the threat towards maritime security in the Red Sea and towards Saudi energy infrastructure. This reflects the same objective pursued by Iran, based on the determination to produce tangible effects in the energy sector and, consequently, at the global level.
The expansion of territorial control towards the coast therefore becomes an essential component of the conflict, enabling full operational capacity in the Bab el-Mandeb area through the combined use of drones, missiles and surface naval operations.
Through a powerful military drive, the Houthis have therefore succeeded within a matter of days in capturing not only all the main settlements along the Red Sea coast, but also, and above all, the strategically important islands overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, particularly Perim, Zuqar, Greater and Lesser Hanish, and Mayyun, from which they can exercise comprehensive control over maritime traffic.
In less than a week, the northern militias captured 5,400 square kilometres of territory, occupied the entire Hodeida province, the coastal areas of Khokha and Dhubab, the port of Mokha and the offshore islands, forcing the various militias supported by Saudi Arabia to flee and capturing a large number of vehicles and items of equipment hastily abandoned on the ground by the southern forces.
Shortly afterwards, they issued a controversial message, claiming that navigation through the Strait would be safe for all shipping companies, with the exception of Saudi companies, which had already been formally notified of a ban on transit some time ago.
This was a fairly clear message in its intent, and not dissimilar to the position that Iran has sought to impose for several months, based on its claim to sovereignty over the Strait and its recognition as the guarantor of commercial traffic, for which—at least for the time being—Ansarallah has stated that it does not intend to impose transit duties.
The move is therefore specifically designed to impose an economic cost on Saudi Arabia, most likely reflecting once again the expectations of compensation that have remained unmet as a consequence of the prolonged stalemate in negotiations over the country’s national reconciliation process.
That Saudi Arabia is the primary target is further demonstrated by the attacks against the facilities of the East-West oil pipeline, Saudi Arabia’s only alternative to transit towards the Suez Canal. These facilities were repeatedly targeted on 11 and 12 September, causing damage whose extent is currently difficult to assess. The most serious aspect of these attacks, however, is probably linked to their point of origin: Iraqi territory. This demonstrates the convergence of interests with pro-Iranian militias and, albeit in a lower-profile manner, with Iran itself.
This represents a severe image crisis for the Saudi kingdom and for the young Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who urged the Trump administration to intervene militarily in the region but was ultimately met with a refusal from the US president, who appears unwilling to alter the already precarious balance of the crisis with Iran.
Saudi forces have consequently had to operate autonomously, seeking to strike targets across a wide area of north-central Yemen. This nevertheless carries the risk of triggering a dangerous new escalation capable of reviving the dynamics of the conflict that Riyadh supported in Yemen from 2015 to 2022, followed by a fragile and uncertain ceasefire.
