On 27 January, the command of the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA) announced that an additional group of its personnel, belonging to the 166th Infantry Brigade, had returned from Belarus, where they had completed an advanced training cycle. The program included urban warfare, infiltration techniques, hostage rescue, and other operational military procedures.
This training initiative stems from the increasingly close relationship between eastern Libya’s authorities and Belarus, formalized on 17 February 2025 with General Khalifa Haftar’s visit to Minsk to meet President Alexander Lukashenko. On that occasion, the two leaders agreed on a cooperation framework heavily focused on military aspects, under which Haftar’s forces would receive training and weaponry (in violation of the arms embargo). At the same time, Russia and Belarus would be granted access to the port of Tobruk to strengthen their logistical networks in Libya, facilitating force projection toward southern Libya and the Sahel region.
Russia has significantly expanded its presence in Libya by leveraging ports and airports as hubs for its African power projection. The airbases of Khadim, Jufra, and Maaten al-Sarra have thus become key logistical nodes for Moscow, enabling the management of supply chains supporting Africa Corps militias operating in the Central African Republic, Mali, and Burkina Faso.
Some of these bases are also suspected of being regularly used by the logistical network through which the United Arab Emirates reportedly supports General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo’s Rapid Support Forces in Sudan. From Libya and Chad, supplies are allegedly delivered to paramilitary militias, particularly in the Darfur and Kordofan regions.
The agreement with Belarus reportedly also includes the delivery of MiG-29 fighter aircraft, which would be dismantled and transported by sea to the port of Tobruk before being transferred to General Haftar’s air force—again in violation of the United Nations arms embargo.
Further evidence of these suspicious activities has emerged from Ukrainian sources, which released satellite imagery of the sanctioned Russian cargo vessel MYS Zhelaniya (17,000 gross tons, IMO 9366110, officially owned by Arctic-Trans LLC). On 16 January, the ship docked at the port of Tobruk under escort by the Russian destroyer RFS Severomorsk.
The vessel—previously part of a larger convoy that included the cargo ship Sparta IV and the tanker Kama—reportedly departed from the Russian port of Baltiysk on an unspecified date and reached the Mediterranean in mid-January. At that point, MYS Zhelaniya and its naval escort broke away from the convoy and headed toward Tobruk.
Although the nature of the cargo remains unknown, Ukrainian sources claim it consisted of military equipment, as suggested by the armed naval escort and attempts to conceal the true destination. The convoy had initially declared the Egyptian port of Port Said as its final destination. On 16 January, however, the ships split, with Sparta IV sailing toward the Syrian port of Tartus and MYS Zhelaniya, together with the destroyer, heading for Tobruk. The final destination of the tanker Kama remains unclear.
The port of Tobruk thus appears to have become a secure landing point for Russia, following growing activity since 2024, including visits by two Russian warships—the cruiser Varyag and the frigate Admiral Shaposhnikov. These visits were made possible by General Khalifa Haftar’s increasing openness to deeper cooperation with Russia and Belarus, through which he reportedly receives continuous supplies of military equipment and training for LNA units.
Eastern Libya is therefore gradually assuming an increasingly central role in managing Russia’s military logistics chain in Africa, enabling Moscow to use Libyan ports and airports as hubs for the transfer of equipment, vehicles, and ammunition both to Africa Corps forces and to regional regimes with which Russia maintains strong ties across the Sahel.
This partnership between Khalifa Haftar’s authorities, Russia, and Belarus risks profoundly altering the military balance within Libya, further complicating efforts toward national reconciliation and the long-sought objective of a unified government for the country.
