On December 5, after surrounding it on three sides, the strategic city of Hama, the third largest in the country, fell into the hands of the Islamist militias of Tahrir al Sham (HTS). The offensive, however, also appears to have been supported by units of another major opposition group, known as the Syrian National Army and also backed by Turkey, although often characterized by conflicting positions with the HTS.
According to what the Damascus regime authorities confirmed, regular Syrian Army forces abandoned the city, deeming its further defense impossible, thus allowing HTS militias to speed up their entry into the town and gradually take over its entire control.
The loss of Hama is a major blow to Bashar al-Asad and opens up the real risk of a possible new offensive southward toward Homs, which is the last bastion before the capital Damascus.
Syrian and Russian air forces have tried unsuccessfully to strike the insurgents stationed on the outskirts of the city, conducting several bombing sorties that have, however, been ineffective in preventing their advance.
In the early afternoon hours of Dec. 5, therefore, government forces deemed it no longer possible to secure the defense of the city, ordering their troops to abandon it and fall back further south to organize a more substantial frontline defense in the vicinity of Homs.
The fall of Hama represents a very hard blow to the Damascus regime forces for two reasons in particular. The first is a demonstration of the fragility of the military capability of the government of Bashar al-Asad and the coalition that supports it with contributions from Russia, Iran, and the Lebanese Hezbollah. For different reasons, each of Damascus’s allies appears to be in the position of being unable to provide swift and substantial military aid to the regime, requiring the worn-out Syrian armed forces to support the military effort on the ground almost autonomously. Although the capacity of the Russian air force is still substantial in the country, performing actions on a daily basis in an attempt to counter the insurgent advance, these are not sufficient to contain the rampant capacity of the various opposition militias that have engaged the regime throughout the northern part of the country.
The second reason, on the other hand, is the absolute strategic importance of the city of Homs, just south of Hama, where the opposition militias seem to be heading now and which represents the de facto last bastion for the defense of Damascus and of the Syrian coast, and especially the ports of Latakia and Tartus, which are also Russian naval bases. Should the capacity of the opposition forces succeed in maintaining the intensity of the offensive cha has launched so far, the possible fall of Homs would represent the de facto division of the territory under the control of the Syrian army into two distinct zones, then opening up the possibility of a further advance in the direction of Damascus.
This is a very serious scenario for the regime of Bashar al-Asad, where, however, there is no shortage of possible variables at present to still be able to determine a development. Iran, in fact, has said it would consider the possibility of direct intervention of its armed forces on Syrian territory, should the Damascus government explicitly request it, while several units of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMU) have expressed interest and readiness to intervene alongside the regular Syrian army.
Iran already has a substantial indirect military presence in Syria, consisting of units established through the recruitment of Afghan and Pakistani fighters, which, however, are deployed mainly in the eastern regions of the country and with the primary task of containing Kurdish forces (allied with the United States) and those – still present in Syria – of the Islamic State.
An autonomous Iranian military engagement in Syria, moreover, may not be militarily and economically easy to sustain, given also the serious crisis that continues to affect the country in the context of lingering tensions with Israel. Indeed, organizing an autonomous expeditionary force in Syria would presuppose a massive deployment of forces capable of depleting the national defense at a time of particular tension and vulnerability in the Islamic Republic.
At the same time, it seems extremely difficult for Russia to be able to increase its military support for Syria, especially through the deployment of ground units that would go to reduce Moscow’s offensive capability on the Ukrainian front. Such a scenario, moreover, could be rendered impossible by the possibility of a threat pushing in the direction of the ports of Tartus and Latakia, from where the Russians have already ordered their ships to fall back, which could severely penalize the logistical support capability of Moscow’s forces.
Finally, it remains to be understood, in terms of scenario, what the actual cohesive capacity of the different components of the Syrian opposition might be when the opportunity arises to launch a final attack on the Damascus regime. Although united by the momentary interest in fostering the fall of the regime of Bashar al-Asad, in fact, the three main components of the opposition in the north of the country are quite conflicting with each other and quite divergent in their political objectives. Finally, it cannot be ruled out that the residual Islamic State forces present in Syria may seize the opportunity to intervene in this complex phase of the crisis by exercising their own autonomous role.
