More than three years after the formal end of the Tigray war (2020–2022), the Horn of Africa once again finds itself on the brink of a possible military escalation. The conflict between the Ethiopian federal government led by Abiy Ahmed and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, which concluded with the Pretoria Agreement of November 2022, has in fact failed to resolve the political, territorial, and military tensions that had fueled the war.
In recent months, these tensions have re-emerged forcefully in Tigray, where three levels of crisis intersect: the deterioration of relations between Addis Ababa and the regional administration, internal fragmentation within the Tigrayan political front, and the growing role of Eritrea, whose involvement could transform the crisis into a regional conflict.
The Pretoria Agreement had envisaged a cessation of hostilities, the gradual disarmament of Tigrayan forces, and the establishment of a transitional regional administration. In 2023, the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray was therefore created, tasked with leading reconstruction and reintegrating the region into the Ethiopian federal state, but many of the agreement’s key points have remained unfulfilled.
Among these, in particular, are the issue of the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from Tigray, the complete demobilization of Tigrayan armed forces, the restitution of territories disputed with the Amhara region, and, no less importantly, the economic reconstruction of a territory devastated by war.
These unresolved issues have kept the region in a state of latent tension, creating the conditions for renewed instability and effectively turning Tigray into a true “geopolitical powder keg” in the Horn of Africa.
One of the most destabilizing developments has also been the political clash within the Tigrayan front itself. The TPLF, which had dominated Ethiopian politics for decades, entered into a deep internal crisis after the war, and starting in 2024 a rivalry emerged between the two most important figures in the movement: Debretsion Gebremichael, the party’s historic leader, and Getachew Reda, head of the regional administration appointed after the peace agreement.
The conflict erupted when the Ethiopian electoral authority challenged the legal status of the TPLF as a national party, triggering a struggle for political control of the region. In 2025, the situation deteriorated further, when rival TPLF factions took control of several cities in Tigray and accused the regional administration of collaborating with Addis Ababa.
This fragmentation has had two major consequences. The first has been the weakening of regional authority, with a power vacuum in local institutions; the second has been the militarization of politics, as many factions still control armed units derived from the former Tigray Defense Forces (TDF).
In other words, Tigray is no longer a unified political actor, but a fragmented system of competing political and military elites. The internal crisis is not merely a personal rivalry between leaders but reflects deeper divisions over Tigray’s future strategy.
Part of the political elite favors cooperation with the federal government to ensure economic reconstruction and stability, while another faction supports a harder, more nationalist line, distrustful of Addis Ababa and oriented toward reasserting Tigrayan political primacy over a territory that is now fragmented and partly occupied by the neighboring Amhara regional state.
The deregulation of the TPLF as a political party and the creation of new rival formations supported by the federal government have further exacerbated political polarization, resulting in fragile and contested governance, in which rival armed groups can quickly transform political tensions into violence.
In recent weeks, the crisis has therefore taken on a military dimension, after a number of local clashes between federal forces and Tigrayan militias in various districts prompted the government in Addis Ababa to strengthen its military presence along the region’s borders.
According to regional sources, the Ethiopian army has moved several divisions toward the Tigray border, as evidenced by reports of military convoys and heavy equipment being transferred to the north of the country.
This military deployment represents the clearest signal yet of a possible resumption of large-scale conflict, while at the same time military movements have also been reported along the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, suggesting that the crisis does not concern only Tigray but the broader regional balance.
The Eritrean factor is probably the element of greatest risk in the current crisis. During the Tigray war, Eritrea fought alongside the Ethiopian army against the TPLF, but despite the 2022 peace agreement, Asmara’s troops have remained in some areas of Tigray, fueling distrust among the local population and regional authorities.
In recent months, the Ethiopian government has accused Eritrea of supporting certain Tigrayan factions hostile to Addis Ababa, in a scenario that represents a reversal of alliances compared to the previous war, but reflects the deep geopolitical rivalries of the Horn of Africa.
Moreover, according to some local sources, Eritrean units have reportedly returned to operate in certain border areas of Tigray, increasing fears of a new conflict.
The deterioration of relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea is not linked solely to the Tigray issue. In recent years, the strategic dispute over Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea has also resurfaced, a central geopolitical issue for Addis Ababa.
The combination of these tensions—Ethiopia’s internal crisis, rivalry with Eritrea, and instability in Tigray—thus creates a highly complex and volatile context, within which the possibility of a direct conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea cannot be ruled out. Such a conflict could have far broader regional consequences, potentially involving other countries in the Horn of Africa and further destabilizing a region already affected by the war in Sudan and widespread political crises.
In the short term, therefore, three main scenarios appear plausible. The first is that of a limited escalation within the Tigray regional state, with continued sporadic clashes between federal forces and Tigrayan militias without escalating into full-scale war.
The second scenario envisages the possibility of a new civil war within Ethiopia, driven by the intensification of political divisions in Tigray and the resulting escalation between certain TPLF factions and federal authorities.
The third and final scenario is the far more serious one of a regional war involving Ethiopia and Eritrea, as a consequence both of tensions in the Tigray regional state and of renewed tensions linked to Addis Ababa’s ambitions for access to the Red Sea. A potentially catastrophic scenario, capable of triggering a prolonged conflict with uncertain outcomes.
