The runoff vote for Iran’s presidential elections, held last July 5, ended with the victory of reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian over ultra-conservative rival Saeed Jalili, resulting in the return of the reformist camp to the country’s leadership after nearly two decades.
The 2024 elections were characterized by several surprises and a rather peculiar dynamic, showing how much the political debate has evolved and become polarized, transforming it profoundly.
The first element of interest in that dynamic is the bitter defeat in the first round of the principalist conservative candidate Qalibaf, who was given from the outset as the real favorite of the elections, and who suffered, on the contrary, the backlash of disaffection from voting even from that part of the electorate that supports the traditionalist area of the conservative system.
The second element, on the other hand, is the dynamics of voter turnout, which in the first round was the lowest in Iran’s experience in presidential elections, strongly polarizing the vote in the direction of ideological extremes and leading to a runoff challenge between the reformist Pezeshkian and the ultraradical Jalili.
However, this polarization fostered an increase in turnout in the second round by about 10 percent (reaching nearly 50 percent of eligible voters), again leading to the reversal of traditional election trends, which are most often characterized by a decline in participation in the second round.
The third element, on the other hand, is that of the ability of Masoud Pezeshkian, a second-tier reformist and mostly unknown especially to the country’s youth components, to assert himself against Saeed Jalili, achieving electoral victory with 53.66 percent of the vote.
A victory built, however, through a short campaign that focused everything on the need for the country to prevent the risk of an ultraradical administration, literally demonizing Jalili and his electoral proposals and taking full advantage of the evident rift within the conservative front, where the principalist and ultraradical formations entered a collision course favoring a transfer of votes of the former in the direction of the reformist front.
This opens the term of office of the Islamic Republic’s ninth president, who in the campaign promised to reopen dialogue with Western countries on the nuclear program, ease the burden of international sanctions on the economy, and implement reforms to ease the heavy social norms imposed on Iranian society. Difficult commitments, which will have to be managed in a political environment characterized by a parliament majority-controlled by ultra-radical forces hostile to the government, which Pezeshkian must try to manage through an exercise of diplomacy and pragmatism, trying above all, to the extent possible, to facilitate the establishment of platforms of common interest with part of the conservative front, the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Republic’s non-elective power apparatus.
The inauguration of the new government is now scheduled for the first half of August, when the shortlist of ministers will be presented and the new executive will have to define the fundamentals of government strategy, which promises to be complex in terms of parliamentary political harmony.
However, the election of Masoud Pezeshkian has triggered enormous expectations both within the country and internationally, where the presence of a reformist-led government is welcomed especially in the prospect of a reduction in regional Middle Eastern tensions, which have now reached a dangerous limit especially in the possibility of a widening of the conflict in Gaza even in the direction of Lebanon.
As limited as the Iranian president’s prerogatives are regarding foreign and security policy strategies, high expectations are for a resumption of dialogue on the nuclear program, which could act as a virtuous multiplier on the regional security dynamics as well, offering real incentives for Iran to cooperate more concretely aimed at mitigating tensions.
The real unknown of the new administration, however, will be on the level of domestic political dynamics, where the ultraconservative front is visibly set to thwart the president’s plans, especially on the strength of their increased political capacity gained through the sharp split in the conservative front, where the once-majority principalist forces now represent the minority wing.
At the same time, the social tightness of the country, already shaken by last year’s protests in the wake of Masha Amini’s death, remains extremely volatile, where too much action by ultraradical forces in opposing the new government – especially on issues of social and economic policies – could lead to the re-emergence of protest uprisings in a short time.
