The mission of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni to Addis Ababa on 13 and 14 February 2026 unfolded in two politically significant moments: participation in the second Italy–Africa Summit and, the following day, in the 39th Summit of the African Union. The initiative is part of a broader strategy aimed at repositioning Italy within the African continent, with the objective of strengthening political and economic partnerships and consolidating the Mattei Plan as the cornerstone of Italy’s projection toward Africa.
The declared objective of the mission was to move beyond a merely national dimension of the Plan, progressively transforming it into a multilateral platform integrated with the policies of the European Union, the G7, and the major international financial organizations. In her address, Meloni emphasized the need for a paradigm shift in relations between Europe and Africa, presenting the Mattei Plan no longer as a statement of intent, but as an operational structure capable of generating tangible results. Two years after its official launch in Rome in 2024, Italy is said to have mobilized several billion euros, combining public and private resources, for projects in key sectors such as energy, food security, infrastructure, healthcare, and education.
Within this framework, Italy has reaffirmed its self-representation as a “bridge” between Europe and Africa. The government’s narrative highlighted a specific Italian predisposition toward dialogue and cooperation, portraying the country as a reliable and respectful partner capable of fostering relationships that are not hierarchical but collaborative.
From a geopolitical perspective, the mission can be interpreted as an operation structured along three main axes: the political consolidation of the Mattei Plan, the projection of Italy within African governance structures, and the strengthening of financial and project-based instruments capable of rendering Italy’s presence in the continent structural rather than episodic.
The first objective concerned the verification of the Plan’s state of implementation following its inaugural phase and the operational launch of projects in 2025. The Addis Ababa summit was presented as a strategic “review,” aimed at assessing progress, identifying administrative bottlenecks, and accelerating implementation where necessary. In this sense, the government sought to demonstrate that the Plan no longer represents a purely political declaration, but rather a concrete governance capacity, based on coordination among enterprises, public finance, climate-related instruments, and multilateral partnerships.
The second objective related to positioning Italy within the African framework, not merely as an external actor with interests in the continent, but as a recognized interlocutor within its institutional settings. Participation in the African Union Assembly carried a clear symbolic and strategic value: accrediting Italy as a political partner rather than simply a bilateral donor. The message that “Europe’s future also depends on Africa” was intended to link European interests—energy, logistics, migration, and industrial supply chains—to a narrative of structural interdependence, moving beyond the emergency-driven approach that has often characterized debates on Euro-African relations.
Within this context, the migration dimension also remains a structural objective of the Mattei Plan. The Italian approach emphasizes addressing the root causes of migration through investments in water, energy, education, and the development of local productive value chains. This reflects a geopolitical logic in which migration management is understood not solely as border control, but as the strengthening of the socio-economic resilience of African systems.
Another element that clearly emerged in Addis Ababa was the issue of African debt, linked to climate vulnerability and the shrinking fiscal space of many states on the continent. The announcement of instruments for debt suspension or conversion in the event of climate shocks enables Italy to position itself on politically and reputationally significant ground, where climate justice, financial sustainability, and competition for influence among global actors intersect.
The third objective of the mission concerned the operational dimension and the consolidation of concrete results. In this area, both material achievements and strategic positioning outcomes can be identified.
Among the former are the introduction of debt suspension clauses in the event of extreme climate events; the relaunch of debt-to-investment conversion programs aimed at channeling part of the debt into shared development projects; the confirmation of sectoral priorities for 2026—structured around the pillars of energy, water, agriculture, health, education, and infrastructure/innovation; and the consolidation of a project pipeline estimated at between 1.3 and 1.4 billion euros, involving approximately fourteen countries.
Among the more intangible results are Italy’s participation in the African Union as a signal of political status and access to African decision-making networks, as well as the strengthening of the narrative of the Mattei Plan as a “partnership among equals.” Presenting the Italian initiative as non-predatory and oriented toward concrete projects constitutes a central element in the competition for legitimacy and influence on the continent.
Overall, the Addis Ababa mission marks a transition from the declaratory phase to the institutionalization phase of the Mattei Plan. However, the credibility of Italy’s strategy ultimately hinges on its ability to translate political framing and narrative into verifiable, sustainable, and measurable results over the medium term. In this respect, the success of the initiative will depend not only on the volume of resources mobilized, but also on the quality of governance, the transparency of processes, and the coherence between geopolitical ambition and implementation capacity.
