On 19 January, the Constitutional Court of the Central African Republic officially certified the results of the presidential elections held on 28 December, confirming the victory of Faustin-Archange Touadéra with 77.90% of the vote.
Touadéra was first elected President of the Central African Republic in 2016 and was subsequently re-elected in 2020. He is one of the key figures in the country’s current political configuration. A mathematician by training, an academic, and former university rector, he served as Prime Minister from 2008 to 2013 during the presidency of François Bozizé. In 2016, he won the presidential election by positioning himself as a figure of mediation after years of civil war and with the support of the international community. However, his government has progressively evolved from a presidency of transition and reconciliation into a strongly personalized regime.
Touadéra has strengthened control over the state apparatus, limited political opposition, and promoted constitutional reforms that have enabled him to extend and consolidate his power. In the realm of foreign and security policy, he has opted for a strategy of externalization, relying increasingly on Russian military support. This has resulted in the deployment of military instructors, forces linked to the Africa Corps (formerly Wagner), as well as logistical and political backing.
The president has also progressively reduced the influence of France and the European Union, instead steering the country toward a close alliance with Russia, which is regarded as the guarantor of regime survival. Pragmatic relations have also characterized ties with China, Rwanda, and most regional African actors.
Accused of growing authoritarianism, repression of dissent, electoral fraud, and human rights violations, Touadéra has nonetheless managed to maintain tight control over Central African institutions through a combination of political nationalism and increasing repression. In 2023, he promoted a constitutional reform that removed presidential term limits, marking a further and openly illiberal shift.
At the same time, however, many Central African citizens regard him as a pragmatic leader who has been able to ensure a degree of relative stability in a fragmented country marked by deep ethnic and religious divisions—albeit at the cost of strong dependence on Russia and an authoritarian drift.
His power rests more on regime security than on a genuine process of national reconciliation, rendering the political future of the Central African Republic uncertain.
The presidential elections of December 2025 were therefore held in a climate of growing tension, characterized by accusations of boycott by opposition candidates, whose approval by electoral authorities to run was granted only in the days immediately preceding the vote.
At the same time as the presidential elections, local elections were held for the first time in 40 years, following the long period of crisis generated by the internal conflict between the predominantly Muslim Seleka rebel movement and the predominantly Christian Anti-Balaka militias. The civil war displaced more than one million Central Africans, many of whom are still hosted in refugee camps, where accurate census-taking and the proper application of voting procedures remain difficult.
According to the National Electoral Authority, approximately 2.3 million citizens were registered on the electoral roll (out of a population of around 5.5 million) and voted at 6,700 polling stations distributed across all provinces of the country. However, the international community has complained of a systematic lack of electoral observers and transparency in vote-counting procedures.
Further complicating participation for opposition candidates was the decision to postpone the elections initially scheduled for August 2025 to December, resulting in an unsustainable increase in campaign costs in most cases.
At the official opening of the electoral campaign on 13 December, most opposition groups had not yet been authorized to participate in the elections, creating a clear advantage for President Touadéra, who was able to begin his campaign without having to engage in political debates with opposition forces.
The president’s main challengers were Anicet-Georges Dologuele, a particularly well-known political leader in the country, and former Prime Minister Henri-Marie Dondra, along with five other candidates of significantly lower profile.
From the outset, however, Touadéra’s victory appeared inevitable. He had built a powerful political strategy around these elections, following the controversial 2023 referendum extending presidential mandates. That referendum served as the prelude to a determined effort to win the 2025 elections, which he ultimately did by securing 77.90% of the vote, compared with 14.66% for Dologuele and 3.9% for Dondra. Touadéra’s victory was further facilitated by the decision of the main opposition coalition—the Republican Bloc for the Defense of the Constitution (BRDC)—to boycott the elections and field no candidate as a form of protest, further reducing the space for political contestation.
Although the presidential elections were accompanied by accusations of fraud and lack of transparency, it is undeniable that the president also enjoys a solid base of support within the country, largely due to the widespread perception that he has restored a measure of stability. This remains the case despite the persistence of conflict involving Seleka militias and other armed groups, which continue to occupy large swathes of territory in regions bordering Sudan.
In 2019, the president succeeded in reaching an agreement between the government and fourteen armed opposition groups, which agreed to sign a peace plan that helped restore a degree of stability. However, six of these groups subsequently withdrew from the agreement, declared it void, and resumed armed conflict, particularly in the eastern regions of the country.
Stability in the central and western regions is ensured primarily by the presence of a United Nations mission (MINUSCA), military support from Rwanda, and a large number of Russian mercenaries from the Africa Corps, who are frequently accused—also in the Central African Republic—of excessive use of violence.
The relationship between President Touadéra and Russia has further strengthened over the past two years, as demonstrated by meetings between the two heads of state in 2023 and in January 2025, during which cooperation agreements were renewed, Russian military support reaffirmed, and Moscow was granted access to numerous mining areas in the country.
A new and dangerous threat to the president, however, emerged just days after the start of his third term, following a new rebellion by Zandè militias in the Haut-Mbomou prefecture. Previously allied with the government and trained by Russian Wagner forces, the Zandè militias soon became autonomous, citing delays in salary payments and expressing disagreement with the Central African government’s political strategy in the region. In 2025, the signing of a peace agreement between the government and the opposition group UPC (Union for Peace in the Central African Republic) was viewed by the Zandè as a betrayal, triggering a renewed spiral of violence that intensified during the election period, when the Zandè sought to prevent voting throughout the Haut-Mbomou prefecture.
