Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Egypt on 1 September, ten years after his previous visit in January 2016, during which a new phase of economic cooperation between the two countries was launched, following the establishment of a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2014.
The visit was framed around the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Egypt, established in 1956 through the initiatives of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Mao Zedong, when Egypt became the first Arab and African country to recognize the People’s Republic of China.
The real purpose of Xi Jinping’s visit to Egypt, however, should be understood in the broader context of China’s interest in establishing new forms of political, economic, and military cooperation with countries across the region, at a time of mounting tensions generated by the conflict between the United States and Iran, as well as by the ongoing conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria.
The Chinese president explicitly referred to the need for countries in the region to develop a “new security architecture”, to become “masters of their own destiny”, and to “reject external interference”. This reflects Beijing’s implicit objective of reducing regional dependence on US security guarantees.
The economic dimension of Xi Jinping’s visit to Egypt was particularly significant, extending well beyond the traditional renewal of infrastructure financing and development programs. The Egyptian government announced the launch of the third phase of development of the Suez Canal Economic Zone, where more than 200 Chinese companies are currently involved in investment programs worth approximately $4 billion. Cairo considers this initiative a priority, particularly at a time of crisis when the conflict involving Iran and the confrontation with the Houthis in the Red Sea have resulted in a significant decline in revenues generated by traffic through the Suez Canal, which now amount to just over $4 billion, compared with approximately $10 billion in 2023.
Cairo and Beijing also agreed to expand the use of their respective national currencies in support of bilateral trade, while Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi stated that he had aligned Egypt’s Vision 2030 with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, while also extending the scope of bilateral cooperation to renewable energy and digital transformation.
These economic cooperation commitments have simultaneously translated into explicit political recognition in support of China, through Egypt’s reaffirmation of the one-China principle, under which Taiwan is regarded as an integral part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China, as well as Egypt’s support for China’s BRICS presidency in 2027.
The 1 September meeting therefore strengthened the path of bilateral economic cooperation already established between China and Egypt, while introducing new elements that broaden the relationship into the security, technological, and regional political spheres.
Particularly significant in this regard was the position expressed by the Chinese president concerning the importance of Nile water flows for Cairo. This position places China more directly within the long-standing dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia arising from the development of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile and its associated reservoir. On this issue, the governments of Cairo and Addis Ababa appear unable to identify a mutually acceptable negotiating framework.
China does not intend, by doing so, to adopt a position in opposition to Ethiopia, which, like Egypt, has been a member of BRICS since 2024. Rather, Beijing is seeking to position itself as a regional mediator and a multilateral counterweight to the US position.
The United States and Ethiopia, in fact, elevated their bilateral security and defence cooperation last August to the level of a global strategic partnership. From Cairo’s perspective, this agreement could alter the military and strategic balance with Ethiopia, with immediate implications for the continuing tensions surrounding the GERD.
China has therefore sought to use this opportunity to strengthen its defence cooperation with Egypt, with the aim of recalibrating regional perceptions of the balance of power while simultaneously positioning itself as a privileged interlocutor between the two countries in efforts to revive the negotiating process.
At the same time, Egypt intends to position itself as a regional point of convergence between China and the United States, opening the way to balanced partnerships designed to enable Cairo to benefit from its relationship with, and support from, both countries according to its own strategic interests.
This approach is also directly reflected in the field of military cooperation, where Egypt continues to benefit from US support—and the associated security guarantees—while operating within a framework in which it has, for the past two years, conducted joint exercises with the Chinese armed forces. The Eagles of Civilization 2026 exercise began on 22 August—the second edition following that of 2025—and saw China deploy its J-16 fighter aircraft to the African continent for the first time. The aircraft conducted joint exercises with the Egyptian Air Force, simulating combat missions, critical infrastructure defence, and search-and-rescue operations.
China participated in the exercise with a substantial deployment of air assets. In addition to the J-16s, these included aerial refuelling tankers, transport aircraft, radar platforms, and helicopters, which reached Egypt in just nine hours, demonstrating China’s growing ability to conduct integrated military redeployments over distances exceeding 6,000 kilometers.
It is therefore unlikely to be coincidental that the military exercises and Xi Jinping’s subsequent visit were scheduled in close proximity to one another. Their timing provides a tangible demonstration that the Egypt-China relationship is no longer merely economic, but is expanding towards increasingly significant military cooperation, built around a model of interoperability which—while not yet amounting to a fully-fledged security alliance—complements the framework of military cooperation that Egypt maintains with the United States.
This diversification of strategic interests, however, while intended by Cairo to constitute a balanced and equidistant model between Washington and Beijing, inevitably raises questions in both the United States and Israel. President al-Sisi will therefore have to manage this strategy with considerable caution and pragmatism in order to avoid disrupting Egypt’s established relationship with its US allies and the continuing predominance of US military supplies.
