On March 17, the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) announced its intention to send delegates to Angola to participate in negotiations promoted by President João Lourenço in an attempt to reach a peace agreement with the March 23 Movement (M23) militias. Until now, Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi had refused any direct dialogue with the rebel militias, which have occupied large parts of North and South Kivu. However, he was ultimately compelled to engage in negotiations due to the M23’s growing consolidation in the eastern regions of the country.
The following day, however, representatives of the Congo River Alliance (AFC), the political-military platform that includes the M23 militias, announced their refusal to participate in the talks organized by the Angolan government. M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka stated that the decision to boycott the Luanda talks was made due to what he described as the European Union’s attempt to sabotage the peace process in the DRC, referring to the recent sanctions imposed on the AFC and its members. Another factor cited as an obstacle to participation was the resumption of military offensives by Congolese forces in the eastern regions. The announcement of the AFC’s withdrawal from the talks came while the Kinshasa delegation had already arrived in Luanda to participate in the scheduled negotiations.
Several factors contributed to the failure of Angola’s mediation efforts, with the most significant being the perceived military advantage that the M23 believes it has gained through its latest offensive. This advantage allows the group to play an unprecedented role in the dynamics of the Congolese regional conflict.
The M23, a rebel group formed in 2012, was initially defeated in 2013 but re-emerged as a major player in 2021, reclaiming control over large portions of North Kivu. Angola, acting under the mandate of the East African Community (EAC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), attempted to mediate peace talks. However, the complex web of regional interests and internal divisions systematically obstructed the process.
The Kinshasa government took a hardline stance during the negotiations, refusing to make significant concessions to the M23, which it considers a terrorist group serving foreign interests—particularly those of Rwanda. President Tshisekedi insisted on the unconditional disarmament of the rebels and their reintegration into civilian society without engaging in direct negotiations over the group’s political demands. This approach made it difficult to find a compromise acceptable to both parties.
A key factor in the failure of the negotiations was Rwanda’s alleged involvement in supporting the M23. While Kigali has consistently denied any direct backing of the rebels, multiple UN reports and independent sources suggest the presence of at least 4,000 Rwandan soldiers in eastern DRC, providing military and logistical support to the group. The presence of Rwandan forces on Congolese territory and the ongoing accusations between Kinshasa and Kigali complicated Angola’s mediation efforts. The lack of progress in diplomatic relations between the DRC and Rwanda further exacerbated the situation.
Despite Angola’s influence as a diplomatic actor in the region, its mediation efforts failed to create the necessary conditions for productive dialogue. The absence of an effective monitoring mechanism for preliminary agreements and the lack of concrete guarantees for both sides undermined the credibility of the negotiations. Additionally, Angola was mediating between two irreconcilable positions without possessing the coercive power to enforce compromises.
Meanwhile, hostilities continued on the ground. The M23 has steadily expanded its control over key strategic centers in North Kivu, strengthening its bargaining position. The Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC), supported by local militias and the UN mission (MONUSCO), launched multiple offensives but failed to achieve decisive gains. This ongoing dynamic reduced pressure on the M23 to accept a settlement, reinforcing its determination to secure political and territorial concessions.
The failure to reach an agreement carries several significant implications. First, it is likely that the M23 will escalate its military operations, seeking to expand its control over additional territories in North and South Kivu. If this scenario unfolds, Rwanda and Uganda—both already indirectly involved—could be drawn deeper into the conflict, increasing the risk of inter-state clashes and a broader regional escalation.
