The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 is an outgrowth of the Cold War, when the great powers, in order to avoid a new axis of tension, decided to reduce the level of conflict between themselves and between the seven states that had territorial claims to the Antarctic continent (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom).
The treaty was based on the idea that states with territorial claims would suspend them, while the two great powers of the time, the United States and the Soviet Union, which had no territorial claims, reserved the right to make them if they wished to do so in the future.
In 1991, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, decisions were taken to further institutionalize the Antarctic governance system: the establishment of an Antarctic Treaty Secretariat based in Buenos Aires, agreements to prevent mining and control fishing, and so on.
The backbone of the whole system is based on cooperation and decisions taken by consensus among the Parties. The states that have the right to express their opinion are the consultative members, of which there are currently 29, very different from the 12 countries that signed the treaty in 1959, which makes the decision-making system more complex.
This whole framework, the fruit of the Cold War and the unipolar moment, could be about to change dramatically.
China, which in 1959 was an impoverished country emerging from a long civil war and regional conflicts, is now one of the most important economies, with five bases in Antarctica, a growing global presence and a major demand for fish and mineral resources, many of which are found either in Antarctic waters or on Antarctic territory.
The Soviet Union no longer exists and the Russian Federation is no longer seen as a reliable member of the international system, but the conflict in Ukraine, at least since 2014, marks it out as one of the most conflictive actors globally.
With lower levels of cooperation and higher levels of competition in the international system, one might wonder about the future of the Antarctic Treaty system: will a product of the Cold War survive 30 years after the end of the Cold War?
Antarctica in general and the Antarctic Peninsula in particular, where the territorial claims of Argentina, Chile and the United Kingdom overlap, are becoming increasingly valuable. Not only because of the mineral resources that may be present, but also because of the fish resources in its waters, and because of its position close to the inter-oceanic passage between the Atlantic and the Pacific. Natural inter-oceanic passages could increase their importance in view of possible disruptions to artificial passages such as the Suez Canal (remember what happened to the ship Ever Given in 2021) or the Panama Canal (affected by the drought of the last two years).
Antarctica is also an unbeatable location for space observations, which can be used not only for scientific purposes but also for military observations and satellite positioning systems.
All this makes Antarctica an object of competition rather than cooperation in the international system, exacerbated by growing tensions between the major powers.
The legal framework of the Antarctic Treaty System should not be taken for granted and regarded as immovable. On the contrary, we believe that its partial or total modification is the most plausible scenario in the medium term.
Tensions are already evident within the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), which is responsible for ensuring compliance with the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). These tensions manifest themselves in a lack of agreement or outright disregard for the limits of fishing quotas in Antarctic waters.
If this scenario of growing tensions materializes, we should consider the implications for the international system. In this sense, it is conceivable that competition could even lead to a realignment outside the Antarctic Treaty system. These trends include:
Developments in the AUKUS: Australia’s territorial claims in Antarctica account for 42% of the total, and if we add those of the UK (which overlap with those of Argentina and Chile) and New Zealand, we reach almost three quarters of the continent’s 14 million square kilometers. Any rapprochement between the UK, Australia and New Zealand (a possible future partner in AUKUS) will certainly have an impact on the Antarctic policies and strategies of these states. We might even add that the tensions in the Indo-Pacific and the coordination of these three Commonwealth countries vis-à-vis China could be replicated on the Antarctic continent.
Russia’s position: The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings also show rising tensions between Russia and other members of the system, reflecting the war in Ukraine. This is in addition to the virtual disappearance of cooperation in the Arctic Council, in addition to the other Polar Regions.
China’s presence: Since becoming a consultative member in 1985, China has opened five bases in Antarctica, including a large presence of Chinese nationals, almost half of all Antarctic tourists.
We can conclude that as long as the importance of the Antarctic continent and its surrounding waters continues to grow, and global tensions reduce the level of cooperation, a system such as the Antarctic, based on the idea of consensus and the fruit of a no longer existing international context such as that of the Cold War, could be substantially modified.
We must be prepared for a much more conflictual Antarctic than the one we have known from the second half of the 20th century to the present day.
